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The expression limited arbitragers used to describe economies where only bounded,
or limited, opportunities for gains are available to the traders from their initial en-
dowments. This concept was rigorously defined in [4], [5] and shown to be central
to the problem of resource allocation; it is also linked to the social diversity of the
economy [7]. It turns out that a simple geometric interpretation can be given to lim-
ited arbitrage: here I show that it is equivalent to bounding the gains from trade,
namely the sum of utilities increases which the traders can achieve from their initial
endowments (Proposition 2, Section 1). From this geometry a somewhat unexpected
new link emerges: a close connection with Arrow's impossibility theorem [1]. I estab-
lish that markets have limited arbitrage if and only in they have no Condorcet triples
beyond certain utility levels (Proposition 3, Section 3). This means that on choices of
great importance, irrational or intransitive behavior does not arise. Since Condorcet
triples are the building blocks of Arrow's theorem, limited arbitrage appears to be at
the core of social choice theory. The connection between limited arbitrage and the
concept of no-arbitrage used in financial markets is discussed in Section 2.
The geometry of limited arbitrage provides therefore a well-defined connection be-
tween two classic forms of resource allocation which have been considered separate and
almost antagonistic until now: markets and public choices. The concept is fundamen-
tal for a market's operation: limited arbitrage is both necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu markets with or without short
sales [4], with finite or infinitely many commodities [10]. It is also fundamental for
social choice: limited arbitrage has been shown to be equivalent to the contractibility
of spaces of preferences [6], a condition which is necessary and sufficient for the exis-
tence of social choice rules which are continuous, anonymous and respect unanimity,
[2], [5], [8], [3]. It is somewhat surprising that while this latter set of axioms of social
choice, introduced in [2], is different from Arrow's, the property of limited arbitrage
is closely connected with both.
1. Limited Arbitrage and Gains from Trade. To offer a formal perspective
one needs a few definitions. An economy E has H > 2 traders who trade N > 2
commodities or assets, so that the trading space is RN\ when short sales are not
allowed the trading space is instead RN+. In the following I shall focus on markets with
short sales: markets without short sales are covered in [4]. A trader i is described by
an initial endowment fi; 6 RN, and by a preference represented by a utility function
U{ : RN —• R, .Ui(0) = 0, which is concave, increasing and satisfies mild regularity
conditions, see the Appendix. Everything in this paper is ordinal, namely independent
of the utility representation; therefore without loss of generality we may consider
utilities where sup/x : x e^^i u,(x) = oo.
One wishes to identify those trading opportunities which could yield unbounded
utility increases for the ith trader. These are described by net trades in A{ = {y € RN :
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VA > 0, Ui(&i -f Ay) > u,-(fi,-) and lim.\—oo ut(fi,- + At/) = oo}, a concept new to the
literature, which contains global information about the trader and is therefore called
a global cone. The trader's market cone is the set of all those prices at which all
trading opportunities in A{ are unaffordable, D{ = {p £ RN+ : < p, (y — fi,) > > 0}.1
The existence of both competitive equilibrium2 and social choice rules is shown to
depend on the relation between the traders' market cones [4], [5], [10]; this relation
also provides a framework for measuring social diversity [7].
DEFINITION 1. The market economy E has limited arbitrage when all its market
cones intersect: Df^i A ^ 4>-
This means that there exists one price, the same for all traders, at which the
trades they can afford only increase their utilities by limited, or bounded, amounts.
The concept of limited arbitrage can also be interpreted in terms of gains from trade,
defined as the maximum increment in the sum of utilities which the traders can achieve
by reallocating the economy's resources:
(H \
Gains from trade = G{E) = Sup I ^ u , ( z , ) - u,-(fi,-) I ,
\t=i /
where for all i nt(x{) > u,-(fi,-) and Xl£Li(x* - fit) = 0-
PROPOSITION 2. An economy E satisfies limited arbitrage if and only if it has
bounded gains from trade, namely G{E) < oo.
For a proof see the Appendix. The geometry of limited arbitrage is simple: it
means that the traders' global cones cannot contain net trades which add up to zero:
~ 3 X{,Xj such that xt + XJ = 0, X{ 6 A{ and XJ € Aj. In other words: all global cones
Ai must lie on one side of a given price hyperplane.
Figure 1 illustrates an economy E\ with two traders and two assets which has
limited arbitrage. Its global cones are A\ and A2 and the price line p leaves both
cones on one side. Therefore net trades in directions which lead to unbounded utility
gains are unaffordable by all traders from their initial endowments at price p. The
gains from trade in this economy G{E\) are bounded.
The economy of Figure 2 does not satisfy limited arbitrage: there are two direc-
tions of net trades w[ 6 A\ and W\ £ A2, yielding unbounded increases in utility and
which sum up to zero. Therefore, there is no price p at which all net trades in A\ and
in A2 are unaffordable from initial endowments. The gains from trade in this economy
are unbounded.
The boundedness of possible gains from trade, which we now know to be equivalent
to limited arbitrage, is fundamental to the existence of a competitive equilibrium: it
is necessary and sufficient [4], [7], [10]. Intuitively this is reasonable: an economy
such as that in Figure 2, where traders wish to take unboundedly large and opposed
trading positions, cannot reach an equilibrium. Desired trades are just too diverse to
be accommodated within the same economy.
1
 Global cones and market cones were introduced in Chichilnisky [4], as was the concept of limited
arbitage.
2
 Limited arbitrage is the first necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium, and it applies to markets with or without short sales and with finite [4] or infinitely many
commodities [10]. Sufficient conditions for existence of a competitive equilibrium with short sales and
infinitely many commodities were provided in Chichilnisky and Heal [9].
2. Limited Arbitrage and No-Arbitrage. In financial markets an arbitrage
opportunity exists when individuals can make unbounded gains at no cost, or, equiv-
alently, by taking no risks. For example, buying an asset in a market where its price
is low while simultaneously selling it at another where its price is high can lead to
unbounded gains at no risk to the trader. No-arbitrage means that such opportunities
do not exist, and it provides a standard way of pricing a financial asset: precisely
so that no arbitrage opportunities should arise between this and other related assets.
Since trading does not cease until all arbitrage opportunities are extinguished, at a
market clearing equilibrium there is no-arbitrage.
The simplest illustration of the link between limited arbitrage and no-arbitrage
is an economy E where the traders' initial endowments are zero, 0t- = 0 for i = 1,2.
Here no-arbitrage at the initial endowments means that there are no trades which
could increase the traders' utility at zero cost: gains from trade in E must be zero.
By contrast, E has limited arbitrage when no trader can increase utility beyond a
given bound at zero cost; as seen in Proposition 2 of Section 1, gains from trade are
bounded. In summary: no-arbitrage requires that there should be no gains from trade
at zero cost, while limited arbitrage requires that there should be only bounded or
limited gains from trade.
The two concepts are related but nonetheless quite different. No-arbitrage is a
market clearing condition: it is used to describe an allocation at which there is no
further reason to trade. It can be applied at the initial allocations, but then it means
that there is no reason for trade: the economy is autarchic and therefore not very
interesting. By contrast, limited arbitrage is applied only to the economy's initial data,
the traders' endowments and preferences, and it does not imply that the economy is
autarchic. Quite to the contrary, it is valuable in predicting whether the economy can
ever reach a competitive equilibrium, and allows us to do this simply by examining
the economy's initial conditions. This is the subject of the next section.
3. Limited Arbitrage and Arrow's Theorem. I shall show next that the
traders' preferences in the economy E satisfy limited arbitrage if and only if they
contain no Condorcet triples of large utility values. Condorcet triples are building
blocks of Arrow's impossibility theorem, and are at the root of the social choice prob-
lem. Thus limited arbitrage eliminates the source of Arrow's impossibility theorem
for choices of large utility values.
DEFINITION 1. A Condorcet triple is a collection of three preferences over a choice
set X, represented by utilities ut; : X —• R, i = 1,2,3, and three choices a, /3, 7 within
a feasible set Y C X such that Ui(a) > ui(0) > 1*1(7), ^2(7) > u2(a) > u2(/3), and
U3(P) > 1*3(7) > u3(a).
Within an economy E, the social choice problem is about the choice of allocations:
choices are in X = RNxH. An allocation (x\...Xfj) is feasible if ][It(x* — fit) = 0.
Preferences over allocations are induced naturally by the traders' preferences over
private consumption: U{(XI...XH) > u,(yt-..y//) <$ «I(*I) > w,(j/t).
DEFINITION 2. In an economy E a family of preferences {«i...u//} has a Con-
dorcet triple of size k if there exists three feasible allocations ak = (a*,***,^) £
X C RNx3\Pk = (/?,*,#,/#) and 7* = (7?,7**73), and three preferences u\,uk2,uk3 6
{UI...UH} which define a Condorcet triple, and such that each trader achieves at least
a utility level k at each choice: mini=i,2,3{[u}r(a*),u*(/?f),tt,-(7*)]} > k.
The following shows that limited arbitrage eliminates Condorcet triples on matters
of great importance, namely on those with utility level approaching the supremum of
utilities:
PROPOSITION 3. Let E be a market economy E with no bounds on short sales.
Then E has social diversity if and only if its traders' preferences have Condorcet triples
of every size.3 Equivalently, E has limited arbitrage if and only for some k > 0, the
traders' preferences have no Condorcet triples of size larger than k.
A proof is in the Appendix: it relies on the fact that limited arbitrage is equivalent
to bounded gains from trade, Proposition 2 of Section 1.
4. Appendix . Definitions: A market economy E is defined by its trading space
and its traders E = {A',Q, G RN+,u{ : X -> R, i = 1...77}, where X = RN, or
X = RN+ when no short sales are allowed. The traders' preferences u, : X —> R are
continuous, concave and increasing: x > y =j> Ui(x) > Ui(y) and u;(0) = 0. When
the trading space X — RN+, if an indifference surface of positive utility intersects the
boundary of RN+ all indifference surfaces of higher utility do too. When the trading
space X = RN preferences are smooth (C2) , 3s, K > 0 : Vx G RN, ||i?w(ar)|| > £, and
||Z)2ii(x)jj < A', and the directions of gradients of an indifference surface which is not
bounded below form a closed set. This includes Cobb-Douglas, CES, strictly concave
and linear preferences, and preferences with indifferences which intersect the axis, and
which contain hairlines. Global cones A{ and market cones D{ were defined in Section
1. The market cone dD{ of an economy E with trading space RN+ is dD{ = DiDS(E)
if S(E) C AT, and dDx = Dx otherwise, where A7 = {v G RN : 3i with < i?,fit- > = 0},
and where S(E) is the set of supports to individually rational allocations: S(E) =
{v e RN : 3(ari...arH) G RH*S'+ with £ ( * i ~ fif) = 0, Ui(x{) > u^Qi) for all t, and
Vs.- G R*T+,Ui(zi) > ufai) =>< v,Zi-Xi >> 0}.The utility set is U(E) = {Ui,...UH €
RH++ ;Vi = l...H3xl...xH withf/, = u t (x , )> ti t(n t) where E S i C ^ - ^ i ) < 0}. The
Pareto frontier P(E) = {V = Vj.-.F// G 6 r(^) :~ 3 1 ^ . . . ! ^ / / G f/(i:) with T'^ > Uj V
j and for some h,\Vh > Uh}-
PROPOSITION 1. The global cones A{ of the economy E are open convex sets.
Proof. A sequence (vn)n=i,2... C C(A{) = the complement of A{, defines hairlines
(Fn)n=i i2..., with Sup{x.x£in)(ui(x)) < oo Vrc. By the assumptions on w,- , V n 3y G
Tn :< Dut(y),w>= 0 if w G Tn. Concavity of u{ implies that Vw G Tn < Dui(\y),w><
0 V A > 1. Assume that on two halflines Fn ^ Fm the utility U{ is eventually con-
stant: 3yn G Tn and ym G Tm such that VA > 1 < Dui(Xyn),w > = 0 Vu; G F n , and
< Dut(\ym),w >= 0 Viu G F m , and Ui(yn) < ux(ym). Let II be a supporting hyper-
plane for the preferred set of u,- at At/m; this determines a halfspace A of RN : Vq G A,
!/{(<?) < i/{(Aym); note that II contains an unbounded segment of F m , and A an un-
bounded segment of F n . Therefore V K > 0 3 zK G Fn and wK G II : \\zK - wK\\ > K
and VA', Ui{zK) - U{{yn) and Ui(wK) = Wi(ym). Since by assumption 3e > 0 : Vx,
||Z?u,-(ar)|| > £, VA' the distance between zK and {w G i?^ : u,(ti') = t/,(ym)} is
bounded: 3T > 0 :VAr, ||2A' - iyA'|| < T, a contradiction. The contradiction arises
from assuming that w, is eventually constant on Fn and Fm with n ^ m; therefore
3n0 : Vj > n0 3y G F-7 :< J9tz,(At/), u> > < 0 Vu? G F-7 and VA > 1. By concavity of w,-,
this implies that along the halfline F defined by v = l imnvn , U{ is bounded, so that
v G C{Ai). Thus C(A{) is closed and A{ open. Convexity is immediate!]
3
 Without loss of generality assume that for all t, Sup^xx^RN ^ut{x) = oo
THEOREM 2. Let E be an economy without bounds on short sales. The Pareto
frontier of the economy E is bounded if and only if the economy satisfies limited arbi-
trage. In particular, the economy E has bounded gains from trade, G{E) < oo, if and
only if it has limited arbitrage.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume E has limited arbitrage. If P(E) were not
bounded there would exist a sequence of net trades {z[...z3H)j=\^... such that V7,
Y?h=\ zh ~ 0 an<^ ^mj->oo(uh(Qh + z3h)) —> 00 for some h.4 It suffices to consider
the case where limj_fOO(ii^(fi^ + z3h)) —• 00 for all h.5 Consider two exhaustive and
exclusive cases: Case 1 and Case 2. Case 1: For infinitely many j's, z3h 6 Ah for all h.
Limited arbitrage requires that there exists a hyperplane that leaves all the cones Ah on
one side for all h> and this contradicts the fact that z3h £ Ah for all h and J2^=i zh = ®-
Since the contradiction arises from the assumption that P(E) is unbounded, P(E)
must be bounded in this case. Case 2: From some j onwards, z3h £ Ah for some h.
Consider the sequence {^/||^|!}j=i,2,... C SN~l, the TV — 1 sphere in RN. Since SN~l
is compact, it follows that there exists a subsequence, denoted also {^/||^||}j=i,2,...
such that limj_oozj[/||rk|| = c*h £ SN~* for all h — 1...11. Assume first that ah £ Ah-
Note that it suffices to consider utilities with indifference surfaces not bounded below,
since when they are bounded below, P{E) is always a bounded set. Then, by assump-
tion, the directions of gradients of each indifference surface define a closed set. Since
we assumed that Q^ $. Ah, it follows that Su/>,\6/?+(u/l(fi/l + Aa^) < 00. This, together
with the assumption on the utilities, implies that if F is the halfline defined by the vec-
tor ah , either 3it? € F where the gradient Duh(z) is orthogonal to F, or else the utility
ith achieves a maximum at y £ F, and is a constant beyond y. These two alternatives
are exhaustive and I will show that in both it is impossible that ah = limj 2^/||zj[||
with limj_kOO(u/l(Q/l + zJh) = 00. If the gradient Duh (w) is orthogonal to F at some
point it;, and for A > 1 Du/^Au;) projected on F is negative, then it is also negative
in a neighborhood. Therefore for directions (3 sufficiently close to ah ,3if > 0 such
that sup r€- r(t/^(j)) < A', a contradiction. The second alternative is that U{ utility
achieves a maximum at w and remains constant thereafter on F. Similar reasoning,
using convexity, shows that limj_>oo(i/^(fl/i, + 2:^ )) = 00 cannot hold either. Since these
two alternatives are exhaustive, Q^ ^ Ah is impossible, so that ah G Ah for all h
where zJh £ Ah from some j onwards. Therefore, in Case 2, V/i = 1...H the vectors
Q/J 6 Ach, the closure of ^1^, and, for some /*, ah G Ah. Since the cones Ah are open
by Proposition 1 in the Appendix, there exist nearby vectors PI...0H s-t- ^ h fih = 0
and Ph € Ah for all h, contradicting limited arbitrage. Limited arbitrage thus implies
that P(E) is bounded. The reciprocal is immediate!)
PROPOSITION 3. Let E be an economy without bounds on short sales and H > 3
traders. E has Condorcet triple of all sizes if and only if it does not satisfy limited
arbitrage.
Proof. Let E have limited arbitrage. For each k > 0, let (ak,j3k,jk) € R3xN*H
and ^1,1/2,^3 C {U\...UH} be a Condorcet triple of size k. Without loss assume
that Vi, Q, = 0, and choose a utility representation : Vi', Suprx.x^fiN\(ui(x)) = 00.
4
 Without loss of generality, we normalized utilities so that supx^RN(uh(x)) = oo.
5
 By the assumptions on preferences if 3(«i...«^)j = i,2... : Vj, ^ h = 1 v}h = 0 and lim^oo(uh(flh +
u'h)) — oo for some h, uh(Qh + u{) > uh(Qh) Wh, then 3{z[...z}H)^l<7,,.: V>, £ f = 1 z{ = 0 and
limj_oo(uh(tth + z3h)) —*• oo for all h.
The three allocations are feasible Vfc, e.g. ak = ( a{ , a j , a j ) G RNx3, £? = 1 (a*) =
0, and Iimfc_+oo(minl=ii2,3(wi(ai),w,(/?^),W{(7^)) = oo. There exist therefore three
traders called 1,2, and 3 and a corresponding sequence of allocations (0fc)fc=i,2... =
(0i,02»03)fc=i,2...: Vfc> E i^ f = ° a n d V i = i ' 2 ' 3 ' suP*-oo Uf(0?) = oo- This implies
that £ has unbounded gains from trade, which contradicts Theorem 6. Therefore E
cannot have Condorcet triples of every size.
Conversely, if E has no limited arbitrage, there exist three traders, called 1,2,
3, with preferences u\,v.2,U2, and three vectors in RN, a (E A\,b € A2, c € A3,
which add up to zero. For any integer k > 0, and small e > 0 consider the vector
A = (£,..., e) € RN+ and the following three allocations: ak - (ha, kb - 2A, kc + 2A),
Pk = (ka - A,kb,kc + A) and 7* = (ka - 2A,Ar6 - A, kc + 3A); each allocation is
feasible, e.g. ka + A:6 - 2A + kc + 2A = Jt(a + 6 + c) = 0. For each k > 0 the three
allocations a*,/?fc,7* and the three utilities 1/1,1*2, ^3 define a Condorcet triple of size
m(k), with lim/j_oo m(k) = oo.D
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Figurel: limited arbitrage is satisfied. The two global cones lie
in the halfspace defined by P. There are no feasible trades that
increase utilities without limit: these would consist of pairs of
points symmetrically placed about the common initial endowment,
and as shown such pairs of points lead to utility values below




Figure 2: Limited arbitrage does not hold. The global cones are not
contained in a half space, and there are sequences of feasible allocations
such as Wi and Wi', W2 and W21, which produce unbounded utilities.
